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Abstract:  
 
The use of crowd-based online technology for raising funds is gaining popularity and credibility. 
This paper seeks to provide a better understanding of the effects of formal and informal 
institutions on the success of a crowdfunding project. It also analyzes how the effects of different 
types of institutions are likely to vary across the four different types of crowdfunding projects: 
(1) crowdlending, (2) crowdequity, (3) reward-based crowdfunding and (4) donation-based 
crowdfunding. A practical implication of this work is that the ease with which entrepreneurs and 
other types of fundraisers can raise money via crowdfunding platforms to fund a project depends 
upon the nature of formal and informal institutions in the economy. A theory of crowdfunding is 
proposed that explains these developing relationships. 
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Article:  
 
1. Introduction 
 
The use of crowd-based online technology (CBOT) for raising funds from a large number of 
people is viewed as a disruptive innovation in entrepreneurial financing as well as other forms of 
fundraising activities. Crowdfunding (CF), the most popular fundraising application of CBOT, is 
considered to be a truly global movement with significant financial and economic benefits. Some 
compare CF investors with angel investors and suggest that CF would create 60 million new 
angel investors in the U.S. alone (Kitchens and Torrence, 2012). According to an estimate of the 
World Bank, the global CF market will reach US$93 billion by 2025 (Swart, 2013). It also has a 
potential to bring significant changes in social practices and political processes. It is thus 
important and timely for regulators, investors, entrepreneurs and other stakeholders to observe 
this rapidly evolving phenomenon and share insights, reflections and observations with each 
other. It is also important for these stakeholders to recognize the forces that are shaping the CF 
phenomenon. This paper attempts to address both of these pragmatic needs. 
 
Regarding global diffusion of CF, the CF platform (CFP), Grow VC claimed that its members 
were in over 190 countries, who funded more than 4000 startups by October 2012. As of 2013, 
there were about 1000 CFPs worldwide, which operated on every continent except Antarctica. 
As of 2013, entrepreneurs in at least 27 countries had used CFPs to raise debt or equity financing 
for businesses (Swart, 2013). 
 
Despite all the hype surrounding the CF, however, in reality, it has been a U.S.-centric 
phenomenon or West-centric at best. For instance, as of August 2012, the U.S. had 191 CFPs, the 
U.K. had 44 and with the rest of the Europe having 100. Massolution's estimates suggested that 
in 2013, the U.S. accounted for 72% of the global CF industry estimated at US$5.1 billion 
whereas the shares of Europe and the rest of the world were 26% and 2% respectively (Say, 
2013). Likewise, in 2012, CF campaigns worldwide raised US$2.7 billion: US$1.6 billion in 
North America, US$945 million in Europe and US$110 million in the rest of the world (infoDev, 
2013). These figures translate to per capita CF investment of about US$3 in North America, 
US$1.30 in Europe and US$0.02 in the rest of the world. 
 
Despite Asia's economic and technological leadership, CF has been slow to take off in the 
region. For instance, CF in Japan is in infancy. In 2013, per capita CF investment in Japan was 
about 15 times as high as in the U.K. (Table 1). In China and India, CF has met with a lukewarm 
response. In Vietnam, the first CFP was launched in March 2013. CF projects in these economies 
have encountered barriers related to institutional environments. 
 
Table 1. The development of the CF industry and related institutions: a comparison of Japan and 
the U.K. 
 Japan U.K. 
CF market size (2013) US$80 million (Warnock and 
Mochizuki, 2014). 
US$578 million (donation based: 
US$496 million, equity-based: US$45 
million, reward-based: US$33 million, 
debt-based: US$4 million) (Alois, 
2013b). 
GDP per capita, 
nominal (current US$) 
(worldbank.org., 
2015a) 
38,634 41,788 
GDP per capita, PPP 
(current international 
$) (worldbank.org., 
2015b) 
36,449 38,452 
Per capita CF 
investment (US$) 
0.63 9.42 
CF investment per 
US$10,000 of GDP 
0.16 2.25 
Laws and regulations 
related to CF 
May 2014: Japan passed legislation 
similar to the U.S. JOBS Act, 
which allows equity-based CF. 
When CF emerged, after the 2008 
financial crisis, investors mainly 
engaged in donation-based or 
reward-based CF in small amounts 
through CFPs (Warnock & 
Mochizuki, 2014). 
Private companies can raise up to 
US$1 million through a CFP. A 
person will be allowed to invest in 
equity CF up to US$5000 
(crowdvalley.com, 2014). 
In 2014, the Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA) introduced a “10 per 
cent” rule, which requires retail 
investors that are neither 
“sophisticated” nor “high net worth” to 
certify that they are not committing 
more than 10% of their net investable 
assets in equity-based CF (Sharman, 
2014). 
The “prudential requirements” for 
loan-based CFPs: Firms will have to 
put in place a certain amount of 
“financial resources” to underpin their 
business depending on the total value 
of the loaned funds. Loan-based CFPs 
are not be included under the statutory 
Financial Services Compensation 
Scheme (FSCS), which can pay 
compensation if a firm is unable, or 
likely to be unable, to pay claims 
against it (out-law.com, 2014). 
Some key features of 
the CF market 
Investors' skepticism about 
promised returns has been a barrier 
to attract investments (Warnock & 
Mochizuki, 2014). 
Many people are making CF 
investments in businesses in 
Northern Japan which were 
affected by the 2011 quake and 
tsunami. They do so to 
“sympathize with the companies 
and their efforts” rather than to 
make a profit (bloomberg.com, 
2015, para 9). 
Some fundraisers were found to 
provide misleading information when 
selling shares. Some also found to 
delete negative comments in forums 
(forbes.com, 2015). 
Some well-known 
CFPs 
Readyfor, Campfire, maneo.jp Crowdcube.com, Seedrs.com, 
SyndicateRoom.com 
The World Bank's 
ease of doing business 
ranking 2015 (out of 
189 economies, lower 
number indicates a 
better rank) 
29 8 
WGI ranking (CAF, 
2014) 
90 7 
 
First, CF is a form of crowdsourcing. While crowdsourcing has been widely studied, and 
considerable interest has focused on its impacts on numerous sectors of the economy such as 
open source software (OSS) development (Stewart et al., 2006), healthcare (Howe, 2006) and 
labor markets (Horton and Chilton, 2010); and organizational functions such as marketing 
(Whitla, 2009) and business process outsourcing (La Vecchia and Cisternino, 2010), its use in 
fundraising activities is a relatively new phenomenon. This research gap is particularly striking 
in light of the fact that CF differs from other forms of crowdsourcing in an important way: it 
involves money. Prior research has suggested that people behave differently in situations 
involving money. For instance, in an experiment, Ellingsen and Johannesson (2009) found that 
about a third of the participants demanded no compensation for their investments of time, 
whereas almost all demanded compensation for equally costly monetary investments. 
 
A related point is that while a rich body of literature has focused on the underlying economic 
aspects of the Internet's two-sided markets (e.g., e-auctions), such markets have been an under-
researched area from the standpoint of fundraising activities, especially from an institutional 
perspective. Huber (1990) suggested that when new uses of a technology are developed and 
made available (e.g., through purposefully engineered modification) or when organizations make 
a better use of the capability of the technology, it is important to reassess and evaluate the effects 
of the technology. 
 
Prior researchers have also found that while the online CFPs tend to eliminate most of the 
distance-related economic frictions such as monitoring progress, providing input, and gathering 
information, they do not eliminate social frictions (Agrawal et al., 2011). It is important to have 
clearly defined rules to encourage entrepreneurship and protect investors and enforce these rules 
firmly. Such conditions reduce the uncertainty that entrepreneurs and investors face in the CF 
environment. This demonstrates the effect of formal institutions such as laws and regulations and 
informal institutions such as social networks and interpersonal trust on the success of a CF 
project. The existing literature, however, does not specify the exact nature and structure of 
institutions that might affect CF. This gap provides further motivation to examine the 
institutional influence on CBOTs' uses in fundraising. 
 
In light of the above observations, the basic idea in this research is that an institutional 
perspective would emphasize on a CF project's acquisition of legitimacy from regulators, 
entrepreneurs, investors and other actors and thus throw a different light on the functioning of the 
CF industry and market. It is also important to emphasize that different forms of CF—
crowdlending (LE), crowdequity (EQ), reward-based CF or pre-purchase (RE), and donation-
based CF (DO)—are likely to involve different legitimacy issues and concerns. The aims of this 
paper are thus to propose an institutional theory of CF and articulate propositions that will guide 
and inform the evolvement of the CF industry and market. The theory presented here suggests 
that formal and informal institutions have influence on CF and that different types of institutions 
have differential patterns of effects on the four types of CF. Specifically it examines the 
following research questions: 
 
RQ1 How do formal and informal institutions affect the success of a CF project? 
RQ2 How do the effects of such institutions differ across different types of CF? 
 
As emphasized above, there is a minute amount of research on the use of CBOTs in fundraising. 
Prior researchers have suggested that in areas like this, much initial research needs to be 
qualitative, concept- and theory-building in character (Eisenhardt, 1989). We draw on existing 
theoretical work and observations of the functioning of the CF industry and market to deduce an 
institutional theory of CF, which may be helpful in guiding future empirical investigation in the 
field. 
 
Framing the theory in the style of positivists (e.g., Iles and Yolles, 2002; Lin, 1998), we present 
propositions describing how institutions affect CF. The propositions are related to each other 
because all of them deal with institutions as independent variables. They also specify 
relationships among relevant variables and thus using the criteria proposed by Huber (1990), 
comprise the essential elements of the theory of the uses of CBOTs for fundraising. By 
themselves, however, propositions do not represent a theory (Sutton and Staw, 1995). We 
provide reasoning and justification for the propositions and relationships, which are an integral 
part of a theory (Webster and Watson, 2002; Whetten, 1989). 
 
Among the five ways identified by Gregor (2006) regarding the use of the term “theory”, the 
approach of this paper can be described as Type IV, that is, a theory for explanation and 
prediction. We explain constructs related to dependent and independent variables, their 
associations and the states covered by them. Such an approach would help develop a more 
refined understanding of the institutions—CF nexus and more finely tuned and accurate 
predictions (Iles and Yolles, 2002). Empirical testing may partly or fully support or refute the 
particulars of the proposed theory. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. We proceed by first examining fundraising via CBOTs and 
suggesting some indicators to measure the success of a CF project. Next, we analyze institutions 
that are relevant to fundraising via CBOTs. Then, we discuss the conceptual framework and the 
propositions. It is followed by a section on discussion and implications. The final section 
provides concluding comments. 
 
2. Fundraising via CBOTs and related institutions 
 
As noted earlier, fundraising by CBOTs is diffusing rapidly worldwide. There are numerous 
types of CF projects. According to Massolution, CF can be divided into four types: donation 
(purely for charity such as watsi, https://watsi.org/), lending (e.g., Kiva's small loans to poor 
entrepreneurs), equity (micro-investing) and rewards. These are characterized by diverse 
motivations of potential investors and are affected differently and to different degrees by various 
institutions and related legitimacy issues. Some representative CFPs and examples of funded 
projects are presented in Table 2. Table 3 provides some examples of institutional influence on 
various types of CF. 
 
Table 2. Some representative CFPs and examples of funded projects. 
CFP Explanation Examples of funded projects 
Idea.me 
(RE) 
• A Latin American CFP, which as 
of February 2013, funded 180 
• Project to create a casual game for iPod, iPhone 
and iPad which would “become a true vehicle for 
learning and cultural transfer” in the industry 
creative projects and raised over 
US$1 million. 
dominated by the Zombie-, ninja- or pirate-themed 
game apps (Leslie Forman, 2011, para. 15). 
Funding goal of US$5000 was met 
(http://idea.me/projects/30/pewencollector) 
Kickstarter 
(RE) 
• Operates in the U.S., the U.K., 
Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand. 
• 2012: people in more than 177 
countries had pledged. 
• Eric Migicovsky's “smartwatch”, which would 
connect to an iPhone or Android phone to provide 
functions including messaging notifications, music 
control, distance and pace calculations for runners, 
swimmers, or bikers. 
• His fundraising goal of US$100,000 was met 
within about 24 h and US$10.3 million raised in 
three months 
Kiva (LE) • As of October 2013, 621,260 
loans amounting to US$487 million 
had been made through field 
partners in 225 countries. 
• A Cambodian farmer, Noun, requested a loan to 
hire people to transplant rice appropriately and in a 
timely fashion, so that she could sell her crops for 
a profit. She received the requested loan of 
US$375 (http://www.kiva.org/lend/598339) 
Symbid 
(EQ) 
• Based in the Netherlands 
• As of September 2013, it funded 
23 startups that raised over US$2.7 
million from over 15,000 
unaccredited investors. 
• Author Martijn Arets applied for funding to get 
his book translated and re-published. In two 
months, 171 investors helped him achieve the € 
20,000 goal. 
Watsi (DO) • A CFP in the global health area, in 
which 100% of donations go in the 
treatment for the person chosen by 
the donor. 
• Works with nonprofit health care 
providers in 13 countries, including 
Cambodia, Nepal, Guatemala and 
Ethiopia. 
• 24 donors funded heart surgery for a 12-year-old 
girl from Nepal, Bageshwori. 
Zoomaal 
(RE) 
• CFP for the Arab world launched 
in July 2013 with a model based on 
Kickstarter and Indiegogo. 
• As of July 2013, entrepreneurs 
from 22 countries across the Middle 
East and North Africa could post a 
project. 
• In August 2013, 543 fans of the Lebanese indie 
rock band Mashrou' Leila contributed over 
US$66,000 to fund the release of the band's third 
album, Raasuk (Taylor, 2013). 
Catarse 
(RE) 
• Based in Brazil. 
• Raised US$1.8 million by 2012. 
• US$70,000 was raised from 3500 people to edit 
and produce a film about the proposed Belo Monte 
hydroelectric dam to be built on the Amazon 
region's Xingu River. In an effort to inform the 
public of the project's potential impact, the film 
captures the views of diverse stakeholders such as 
indigenous peoples, environmental scientists and 
Brazilian politicians (Rocha, 2012). 
Note: crowdlending (LE), crowdequity (EQ), reward-based CF (RE), donation-based CF (DO). 
 
Table 3. Institutional influence on various types of CF. 
Type of CF Some factors leading to 
international variation 
Examples 
Crowdequity (EQ) • Regulative institutions related to 
CF are not developed at the same 
rate across countries. 
• 2012: Only Australia, France, 
Ireland, Netherlands, Switzerland, 
and the U.K. were the OECD 
countries that permitted CFPs to sell 
equity. 
• 2012: the U.S. passed JOBS Act. 
Parts of the Act went into effect 
September 2013. 
• CF started in China in 2011 but 
CFPs are operating in a regulatory 
gray area. 
Crowdlending (LE) • Legal considerations for 
crowdlending vary tremendously 
from country to country. 
• Since KIVA is not a complete 
banking system, legal issues in India 
do not allow it to lend money directly 
(chicagosociety, 2008). 
Donation-based CF 
(DO) 
• People across the world differ in 
generosity or propensity to engage 
in helping a stranger. 
• Some observers note that most 
Indians are less likely to offer money 
if there is no return. 
Reward-based CF 
(pre-purchase) (RE) 
• The degree to which people 
support a reward-based CF may 
be driven predominantly by 
purely philanthropic motive rather 
than an interest in the reward. 
• Most successful CF campaigns in 
Australia New Zealand and Latin 
America have been those related to 
music, dance, theater and other 
creative projects (launcht.com, 2013). 
Crowdlending (LE), crowdequity (EQ), reward-based CF (RE), donation-based CF (DO). 
 
2.1. The dependent variables 
 
Weber (2012, p. 6) has identified constructs, their associations and the states covered by them as 
essential parts of a theory and argued that “accurate and precise description of the parts is 
important because they circumscribe the boundary or domain of the theory”. He suggested that 
the initial focus of a theory evaluation should be on the quality of its parts. In this section, we 
define and discuss the construct related to the dependent variables in detail. 
 
The fundraising success of CBOT can be considered as a performance indicator of CF rather 
than the ultimate impact on the economy or the society. Let us explain a little, what we mean by 
a performance indicator of CF. For this purpose, we borrow from Ahmad and Hoffmann's (2008) 
framework for entrepreneurship indicators, which consists of three main building blocks: 
determinants, performances and impacts Ahmad and Hoffmann provide a useful analogy to 
understand relationships among them: Assume that a passenger wants to go from point A to 
point B by time t (impact). There may be various means of transportation available. Factors such 
as a car's engine size and fuel consumption rate are the determinants. During their journey, 
passengers are informed about the current status of the direction and time by speedometers and 
GPS readings (the performance indicators). 
 
Following the above analogy, CF impacts reflect the value created by CF projects for the society 
or the economy. These are the ultimate objectives that policy makers want to accomplish. For 
instance, on time delivery of the product promised by the entrepreneurs or the artist could be 
considered as impact indicators of CF projects. One study found that over 75% of crowdfunded 
ventures delivered the products much later than promised and a large proportion of CF projects 
were over eight months behind the schedule (Mollick, 2013). Contribution of CF in job creation 
and economic growth could be other examples of impact indicators. 
 
Our dependent variable (DV) is the extent to which a CF project is able to achieve the targeted 
fundraising goal. The fundraising success of a CF project is CF performance measure. Note that 
CF performance measures are the CF-related actions that are instrumental in delivering the 
impacts of CF. These indicators tell the progress toward achieving the ultimate objectives. 
Formal and informal institutions, on the other hand, are the determinants. 
 
2.2. The boundary conditions 
 
A theory covers only a particular class or state of things (Weber 2012). It is important to be clear 
about the boundary conditions for the study and additional conditions for some of the 
propositions. This paper uses more general institution theory as a kind of grand theory and looks 
in detail at CF to see where the general notions apply. One boundary condition of our theory is 
that it can explain the success of a CF project that can only be attributed to rules and norms in the 
fundraiser's domestic environment. That is, it does not attempt to explain the effects of 
institutions in different jurisdictions. An additional boundary condition of our theory is that some 
of the propositions mainly address the effects of institutions during the early phase of the 
development of the CF industry or when CF-related regulations are not clearly developed. For 
instance, the effect of general regulatory framework to facilitate entrepreneurship on equity-
based CF is likely to be less pronounced when regulations relevant to the CF are not well 
developed. A similar point can be made about the effects of CF-related trade associations. A 
final boundary condition is that we do not address outcomes beyond the ability to raise funds 
such as the economic impact to the society. Not all CF projects which are able to raise targeted 
funds promote social utility. 
 
2.3. Taxonomy of institutions and their relevance to fundraising via CBOTs 
 
Following North (1990, p. 27), institutions can be defined as the “macro-level rules of the game” 
which include “formal constraints (rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints (norms of 
behavior, conventions, and self-imposed codes of conduct), and their enforcement 
characteristics” (North, 1996, p. 344). However, understanding institutional processes is more 
complex than suggested by this definition. In this section, we describe the formal and informal 
institutions and present a taxonomy of its possible interpretations ranging from laws, regulations 
and social pressure to personal moral norms. 
 
One of the earliest scholars to write about rules was Black (1962). In his philosophical treatment 
of this concept, he identified four different ways of the use of the term rules in everyday 
conversations: regulations, instructions, precepts, and principles. The macro-level rules proposed 
by North (1990) can be viewed as consisting of regulations and precepts. In this way, institutions 
can be considered to be a conceptual subset of the rules as defined by Black (1962). In line with 
this view, this section builds on the definition of institutions and a comprehensive taxonomy of 
rules provided and laid out by Ostrom (2005). Black's regulations and precepts have guided 
Ostrom in her formulation of the definition of institutions, which she defines as “the rules, 
norms, …. used by humans in repetitive situations” (Ostrom, 2005, p. 824). When used as 
regulation, rules are something that are “laid down by an authority (a legislature, judge, 
magistrate, board of directors, university president, parent) as required of certain persons (or, 
alternatively, forbidden or permitted)” (Black, 1962, p. 115). An example is: “The dealer at 
bridge must bid first”. When used in a regulation-sense, one can refer to activities such as the 
rule “being announced, put into effect, enforced (energetically, strictly, laxly, invariably, 
occasionally), disobeyed, broken, rescinded, changed, revoked, reinstated” (Black, 1962, p. 109). 
 
Ostrom (2005, p. 831) describes rules as used in the (moral) precept sense as “generally accepted 
moral fabric of a community” and “cultural prescriptions” and refers them as norms. Norms are 
“shared prescriptions known and accepted by most of the participants themselves involving 
intrinsic costs and benefits rather than material sanctions or inducements” (Ostrom, 2005, p. 
831). Norms encompass a wide range of meanings and operate at various levels of the social 
system. For instance, social norms govern or reflect people's expectations of behavior in the 
entire society (Gouldner, 1960; Williamson, 1993). Differentiating from use of rules in the 
regulation sense, Ostrom (2005, p. 831) notes that “one would not speak of enforcing, 
rescinding, or reinstating a rule in the precept sense”. A precept can also be understood as a 
“maxim for prudential or moral behavior” (Ostrom, 2005, p. 831). An example is: “A good rule 
is: to put charity ahead of justice” (Black, 1962, p. 111). Certain CF-related decisions and 
activities (e.g., propensity to engage in online transaction and help a stranger) can be considered 
to be practical precepts and are more likely to be viewed as prudent and/or moral according to a 
particular criterion of success defined in a given cultural setting compared to a different setting. 
 
Norms can be mapped to what North (1990) refers as informal institutions, which are especially 
important in understanding social friction-related issues in CF. Norms are rules-in-use rather 
than rules-in-form. It is important to note that rules-in-use are the “dos and don'ts” that may not 
exist in any written document and sometimes may actually be contrary to the “dos and don'ts” 
written in formal documents (Ostrom, 2005, p. 824). 
 
Galtung (1958, p. 127) distinguishes two types of informal constraints or norms facing a person 
(P): Institutionalized norms are “norms from other members from the social system to P” and 
internalized norms are “norms from P to himself.” This emphasis on institutionalized and 
internalized norms is echoed in more recent perspectives on institutions. For instance, Scott 
(1995, p. 40) observes the existence of external and internal dimensions in institutions by stating 
that values and norms “… are both internalized and imposed by others”. 
 
In order to better illustrate institutionalized and internalized norms, let us consider an example 
related to individuals' intention to engage in blood donation. Lemmens et al. (2005, p. 948) 
measured the sources of social influences by asking a person what her/his parents, friends, 
partners and other loved one would think regarding the person's participation in donating blood 
(e.g., “My parents think I should donate blood”). Likewise, prior researchers have found that 
personal moral norm, which is the perceived personal responsibility to perform the behavior 
regarding blood donation was among the most important predictors of the intention to become a 
blood donor (Lemmens et al., 2005). Prior research suggests that personal moral norm, which 
measures an individual's feeling, judgment and disposition regarding the moral obligation to 
undertake a behavior, is an important predictor of the individual's intention to donate blood 
(Armitage and Conner, 2001). Lemmens et al. (2005, p. 948) measured personal moral norm 
with items such as “I feel a moral obligation to give blood,” “I feel a personal responsibility to 
give blood,” and “It is a social obligation to give blood”. 
 
Industrial norms and individual transaction norms are also examples of institutionalized norms. 
Industrial norms govern the functioning of an industry (Macaulay, 1963; Scherer, 1980). 
Individual transaction norms, on the other hand, are developed between individual firms (Zhang 
et al., 2003). 
 
We use Scott's (1995, 2001) pillar model as the framework for analyzing CF. Scott's approach 
integrates various institutional theories and approaches from a wide variety of research 
disciplines such as economics, sociology and anthropology and thus encompasses the concepts 
discussed above. In this way, the approach to institutions used in this paper is broader in scope 
than that typically used by information system researchers (e.g., Anonymous, 2014; King et al., 
1994). 
 
Scott has conceptualized institutions as composed of three pillars: regulatory, normative and 
cognitive, which relate to “legally sanctioned,” “morally governed,” and “recognizable, taken-
for-granted” behaviors, respectively (Scott et al., 2000, p. 238). North's formal constraints can be 
mapped to Scott's (2001) regulative pillar while informal constraints can be mapped to normative 
and cognitive pillars. 
 
Regulative institutions consist of “explicit regulative processes: rule setting, monitoring, and 
sanctioning activities” (Scott, 1995, p. 35). These institutions are related to regulatory bodies and 
the existing laws and rules that influence CF and focus on complying with regulation (Kshetri, 
2005, 2007). Adhering to these institutions, individuals and organizations would not suffer the 
penalty for noncompliance (Hoffman, 1999). 
 
Scott (1995, p. 40) suggests that cognitive elements constitute the “nature of reality and the 
frames through which meaning is made”. They represent subconsciously accepted rules and 
customs as well as some taken-for-granted cultural accounts related to CF. Individuals' 
propensity to trust strangers and help others is tightly linked to the success of a CF project. 
Equally important is also the disposition to trust CFPs. 
 
Normative components introduce “a prescriptive, evaluative, and obligatory dimension into 
social life” (Scott, 1995, p. 37). Elements of normative institutions also include trade or 
professional associations and other interest groups (e.g., India's National Crowdfunding 
Association and Canada's National Crowdfunding Association) that can use social obligation and 
codes of conduct to induce CF-related behaviors. The basis of compliance in this case derives 
from social and professional obligations and non-compliance can result in societal and 
professional sanctions (Grewal and Dharwadkar, 2002). 
 
The taxonomy outlined above would suggest that institutions, which consist of regulations and 
precepts, can be divided into regulative, normative and cognitive components. The next section 
addresses how these components may affect various types of CF. 
 
3. The conceptual framework and the propositions 
 
Based on the taxonomy of interpretations of rules discussed above, Table 4 presents how Scott's 
three institutional pillars are related to various types of CF. The unit of analysis is a CF project. 
 
Table 4. Independent variables related to institutions included in the theory AND effects on the 
success on various types of CF. 
Type of CF LE EQ RE DO 
Regulative 
(“laid down by 
an authority”) 
 Proposition 1: A clear CF–related 
regulatory framework that balances the 
interests of entrepreneurs and investors 
reduces uncertainty (e.g., CFPs in China 
are operating in a regulatory gray area. 
Taobao shut down Make.V’s offerings 
to sell its stocks on its website).  
  
 Proposition 2: CF is likely to be treated 
more favorably by the regulators in 
countries, which have a favorable 
entrepreneurial climate (e.g., Whereas 
generous tax breaks for investing in seed 
stage firms make equity CF an attractive 
option in the U.K., in Brazil, bank Caixa 
Econômica Federal wants to classify the 
activity as a contest with prizes, which 
has extremely high taxes on payouts). 
  
Proposition 3: Authoritarian political regimes tend to oppose CBOTs due to these 
technologies’ democratic nature (e.g., In Vietnam creative and content projects such as those 
related to CF are strictly regulated by the Ministry of Culture). 
Cultural–
cognitive 
“norms from P 
to himself.” 
Proposition 4: People in some cultures have a tendency to view transacting online as an 
unprudential act (e.g., Asian economies’ unfavorable attitude towards online transactions: 
Singaporeans are not comfortable with providing credit card details to an unknown site. 
Indonesians are less likely to trust the Internet to facilitate financial transactions). 
Proposition 5: In a society characterized by a low degree of thin trust between strangers, 
people are less willing to contribute to/invest in fundraising efforts by a stranger (e.g., Runa 
Capital’s Investment Director and the CEO of the Indonesia’s Wujudkan.com have noted 
how mutual mistrust and the lack of trust to strangers have hindered CF).. 
Type of CF LE EQ RE DO 
Normative 
(“norms from 
other members 
from the social 
system to P”) 
  Proposition 6: A society 
characterized by a high 
tendency to voluntarily allocate 
time, money and other 
resources to charitable, social 
and humanitarian initiatives 
provides a supportive 
environment for CF projects 
(e.g., Investors in India, which 
is among the least altruistic 
countries, are speculated to be 
less likely to invest in CF if 
there is no return). 
 Proposition 7: Professional/trade associations help 
improve the CF ecosystem (e.g., India’s and Canada’s 
NCFAs have taken measures to promote CF). 
 
Note: crowdlending (LE), crowdequity (EQ), reward-based CF (RE), donation-based CF (DO). 
 
Whetten (1989, p. 491) argued that “[d]uring the theory-development process, logic replaces data 
as the basis for evaluation”. Prior researchers have suggested that theoretical explanations of a 
phenomenon are considered to be a main source of logic (Webster and Watson, 2002). In the 
case of this paper, institutional theory has been used as the major theoretical framework. As 
suggested by Webster and Watson (2002), we also employed past empirical findings as a line of 
reasoning in order to develop propositions. They include indicators related to cross-national 
differences in the number of CFPs, the size of the CF industry; results of studies undertaken to 
understand the motivation that drives funding in artists' projects (e.g., Galuszka and Bystro, 
2012) and Charities Aid foundation's World Giving Index. Practices and experience are also 
valuable sources of reasoning (Webster and Watson, 2002). Sources in this category include 
Massolution, Russia's Runa Capital, the Indonesian CFP, Wujudkan.com and trade associations 
such as India's National Crowdfunding Association. 
 
3.1. Regulative institutions' effects on fundraising via CBOTs 
 
3.1.1. Regulations to protect investors and entrepreneurs: effects on equity-based CF 
 
Equity-based CF is of particular concern for regulators because individuals may be lured to make 
substantial amount of equity investments in CF ventures. Some have referred CF as “a scandal 
waiting to happen” (Loveless, 2013, para. 1). Regulatory frameworks ensuring investor 
protection and facilitating entrepreneurship are thus important for equity-based CF (Table 4). 
 
A criticism of CF is that this form of investment is likely to leave unsophisticated investors 
vulnerable to fraud. Despite attempts of CFPs to ensure transparency, existence of opportunities 
for investors and donors to ask publicly for information and share with peers, availability of third 
party companies such as crowdcube, which investigate companies and perform background 
checks (Avery, 2012), there are still chances of opportunistic behaviors. This is because of the 
high failure rate among new business ventures, especially small businesses, and the fact that 
firms raising money through CF are required to make only limited disclosures (ElBoghdady, 
2013). A chief concern for the regulators is to provide frameworks that provide sufficient level of 
protection to investors against possible frauds and impose liability. Such frameworks can 
promote investor confidence and facilitate equity-based CF. 
 
A comparison of the U.K. and Japan indicates that the U.K. has more established regulatory 
frameworks and practices than Japan, which may explain the former's more developed CF 
industry. For instance, some firms were found to engage in fraudulent practices (Table 1). The 
offending CFPs were contacted by the FCA and were asked to make necessary changes to ensure 
that they were fair, clear and not misleading and fully compliant with our rules (forbes.com, 
2015, para. 6). The FCA reported that all the firms showed willingness to comply and most made 
the required changes (forbes.com, 2015). 
 
The arguments presented so far focused on protecting investors. There are, however, two sides of 
the success in a CF project. While it is important to have rules that effectively screen out for 
nefarious projects, rules that encourage CF for legitimate projects are equally important. It is thus 
important to have rules and regulations that balance the interests and perspectives of fundraisers 
via CFPs (e.g., entrepreneurs) as well as investors or fund contributors. 
 
In order to better understand the roles of regulatory framework that balances the interests of 
entrepreneurs and investors, we can borrow from the literature on OSS development. Prior 
research conducted in the context of OSS development has indicated that user and developer 
interests are key success measures (Stewart et al., 2006). Extending this finding in the current 
study, it can be argued that keys to the success, growth and sustainability of CF projects are 
regulations that protect the interests and expectations of both investors and entrepreneurs. It is 
likely that some regulations enacted to protect investors may work against entrepreneurs and vice 
versa. A key challenge is thus to adjust regulations to account for the overall situation of CF in 
order to strike a workable balance between the interests and perspectives of entrepreneurs and 
the potential risks of investors. 
 
Some economies have devoted particular attention to developing laws and regulations that help 
entrepreneurs raise equity-based CF and minimize the risks for investors. The U.S. passed 
Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, which was signed into law in April 2012. The Act 
allows small firms to sell equity stakes online to a large number of investors. Businesses will not 
face a wide array of rules and red tapes involved with larger equity offerings for raising less than 
US$1 million. This is important as most entrepreneurs are unable or unwilling to take the time to 
complete a huge amount of paperwork. Parts of the JOBS Act which went into effect in 2013 
lifted the ban on mass marketing CF offerings to accredited investors (net worth greater than 
US$1 million or individual's/couple's income over US$200,000/300,000 for the past two years). 
The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority and the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) worked to draft CF rules. The SEC also asked CFPs to voluntarily register (ElBoghdady, 
2013). 
 
Some OECD economies adjusted CF-related regulatory frameworks earlier than the U.S. 
(Kshetri, 2014a). As of 2012, Australia, France, Ireland, Netherlands, Switzerland, and the U.K. 
had permitted CFPs to sell equity shares (Ahlers et al., 2012). In 2014, Japan passed legislation 
similar to the U.S. JOBS Act. 
 
In other economies, regulatory efforts related to CF are at various levels of development. For 
instance, in 2013, the Taiwanese government teamed up with GreTai Securities Market to 
commission studies on CF in order to ease access to capital for startups. In most developing 
economies, on the other hand, the development of CF is hindered by the lack of CF-related 
regulations. For instance, online CF started in China in 2011 but CFPs are operating in a 
regulatory gray area (Sandlund, 2012). To take an example, Make.V, a startup on online content 
production and distribution, used the e-commerce website, Taobao to sell stocks. Within a 
month, about 1200 individuals bought 680,000 shares worth 816,000 Yuan. Taobao subsequently 
argued that Chinese regulations do not allow fundraising by issuing stocks, bonds or debts 
without completing the legal process. Make.V's offering was thus deemed illegal. Taobao 
removed Make.V's listing from its website (Xiang, 2013). 
 
The existence of a clear CF-related regulations and their enforcement in a predictable way is 
important for the success of a CF project, which can reduce the uncertainty of the outcome, and 
increase the predictability that entrepreneurs and other actors in the CF ecosystem face. Clear 
regulations can help an entrepreneur get supports not only from investors but also from key 
players in the CF ecosystem. For instance, players in the value chain (e.g., Taobao in Make.V's 
CF project) are less constrained by concerns about breaking the law. A related point is that well-
developed regulative institutions can help improve the quality of CF proposals. A CF proposal 
that contains clear articulation regarding the compliance with CF-related regulatory requirements 
is likely to be more convincing and attract investors and funders. 
 
The consequences of effective CF regulations are that entrepreneurs can raise money from 
CBOTs and that investors have confidence that they will be protected from fraudulent CF 
projects. It is proposed: 
 
Proposition 1 
 
Ceteris paribus, an entrepreneur's success in raising equity-based funds via CBOTs is positively 
related to the existence of a clear CF-related regulatory framework that balances the interests of 
entrepreneurs and investors. 
 
3.1.2. Regulatory framework to facilitate entrepreneurship and the effects on equity-based CF 
 
Regulators have special concerns regarding equity-based CF for which regulatory frameworks 
are not well-developed in most economies. In such conditions, it is reasonable to assume that 
laws and regulations that laid down for a broader scope of activities and purpose (e.g., 
entrepreneurial activities such as raising finances and investments) may be applied to equity-
based CF (Table 4). 
 
Countries vary widely in the degree of friendliness of the regulatory framework for 
entrepreneurship. In economies where entrepreneurs face constraints and distortions such as red-
tapes and high tax burdens, entrepreneurs may be discouraged from raising equity-based CF. On 
the other hand, in a country where promoting productive entrepreneurship is a national priority, 
the legislature and the government may put their support behind equity-based CF even without 
clear legal rules. 
 
Let us compare Brazil and the U.K. for this purpose, which ranked no. 120 and 8 respectively in 
the 2015 World Bank's ease of doing business index. In the U.K., generous tax breaks for 
investing in seed stage favor equity CF (MacLellan, 2013). On the other hand, in Brazil, the 
undeveloped regulatory framework has led to a problematic interpretation of CF. The state bank 
Caixa Econômica Federal, which is the government department responsible for regulating 
lotteries and other contests, wanted to classify CF as a contest with prizes. Such interpretation 
may limit the growth of the CF due to extremely high taxes on payouts (flaviogut.com, 2012). In 
line with these arguments, the following proposition is presented: 
 
Proposition 2 
 
Ceteris paribus, in the absence of a clear CF-related regulatory framework, an entrepreneur's 
success in raising equity-based funds via CBOTs is positively related to the degree of 
friendliness of the general regulatory framework for entrepreneurship. 
 
3.1.3. Authoritarianism as regulative institutions: effects on all types of CF 
 
Authoritarian regimes tend to use ill-defined executive power to impose constraints on political 
institutions, groups and the public through repressive tactics and prohibition of anti-regime 
activities (Shorten, 2012). Such rules, as well as monitoring and sanctioning systems are 
regulative processes and thus are a key component of regulative institutions (Scott, 1995). 
Authoritarian regimes' attitude and orientation toward CFPs are likely to affect all types of CF 
negatively (Table 4). 
 
Prior research indicates that the compatibility of an innovation with the needs of various actors 
determines its diffusion rate (Rogers, 1983). CBOT and democratic nature of the CF seem to be 
incompatible with authoritarian regimes, which have demonstrated distastes for ICTs that allow 
interpersonal interactions. For instance, Buchner (1988), in a comparison of the diffusion of 
telephone and television in Marxist and non-Marxist European nations, found that the 
penetration rates of telephones in comparison to television were much lower in the former than 
in the latter. 
 
The Internet is arguably a key force to promote democracy (Pitroda, 1993). A related point is that 
CF arguably “democratizes finance” (Shiller, 2013, p. 22). Authoritarian regimes tend to oppose 
the general public's unfettered use of the Internet by censorship and cyber-control measures, 
which are likely to hamper CF activities. In order to illustrate this, let us consider some countries 
in the “not free category” of Freedom House's survey of political freedoms. In January 2015, the 
government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo ordered to shut down the Internet and 
SMS services. Other authoritarian regimes in Africa such as Egypt, Uganda, Sudan and Central 
African Republic have engaged in similar practices (Micek, 2015). China's approach to 
regulating the cyberspace reflects the tension it faces between using modern ICTs to maintain 
unity and stability via cyber-control and using them to stimulate economic growth and 
productivity (Kshetri, 2014b). 
 
The above concerns have been raised in CF. For instance, in Vietnam creative and content 
projects are strictly regulated by the Ministry of Culture. The founder of Vietnam's first CFP, 
IG9 noted that CF disrupts the top-down model dominated by big investors and empowers 
investors (Do, 2013). As Make.V's case discussed above suggests, private companies such as 
Taobao are required to self-regulate online activities on their websites. Overall, CF's bottom-up 
and participatory approach would pose difficulties in countries without political freedom where 
online contents are largely top-down and monitored. Authoritarian regimes are thus less likely to 
accept the legitimacy of CF. Based on above discussion, the following proposition is presented: 
 
Proposition 3 
 
Ceteris paribus, a CF project (LE, EQ, RE, DO) is less likely to be successful in raising funds via 
CBOTs in an economy characterized by an authoritarian political structure. 
 
3.2. Cultural-cognitive institutions' effects on fundraising via CBOTs 
 
Individual trust reflects a potential investor's perceptions regarding the reliability and integrity of 
the CFP or the organization raising the funds. Prior research indicates that such a mental map can 
be considered to be a component of cognitive institutions (Kshetri, 2013; Scott, 2001). 
 
3.2.1. Trust in online transactions as cultural–cognitive institutions: effects on all types of CF 
 
An important aspect of potential CF investors' mental maps concerns attitudes toward CFPs. The 
degree of trust that potential investors place on CFPs affects the performance of all types of CF 
(Table 4). For instance, consumers in many Asian economies are characterized by an 
unfavorable attitude toward online transactions. In these economies, the lack of a sizable market 
of early adopters comfortable with supporting CF through online transactions has hindered the 
growth of the market. Regarding the slower take off of CF in Singapore, Renyung Ho, co-
organizer of CreativeMornings Singapore and co-founder of Kennel, a co-working space, noted: 
“One problem we faced as project creators was that some of our pledge supporters were not 
comfortable with providing credit card details to an unknown site. Many were also not familiar 
with using PayPal. Instead, we got more supporters pledging money through bank transfers and 
cheque deposits” (Soh, 2013, para. 18). Likewise, the CEO of the Indonesian CFP, 
Wujudkan.com, Mandy Marahimin noted that “a lot of Indonesians still have yet to trust the 
Internet to facilitate financial transactions” (ehipnews.com, 2013, para. 2). 
 
As noted earlier, cultural factors play a major role in determining what might be regarded as a 
prudent decision (Ostrom, 2005). The line of argument developed above leads us to the 
suggestion that for people in many Asian economies, transacting online is against their principles 
of prudent behavior. In sum, we argue that: 
 
Proposition 4 
 
Ceteris paribus, a CF project (LE, EQ, RE, DO) is less likely to be successful in raising funds via 
CBOTs in an economy characterized by a low degree of trust in online transactions. 
 
3.2.2. Thin trust between strangers as cultural–cognitive institutions: effects on all types of CF 
 
Investing in CF, irrespective of its type, often involves contributing to or investing in fundraising 
efforts initiated by a stranger. As noted earlier, the laws in many economies do not allow selling 
equity stakes to CF backers. Investors may receive token gifts, rewards and recognition. Some 
CFPs such as Indiegogo and Kickstarter train consumers to commit to buy goods even before 
their existence (Kshetri, 2014a). Such commitment requires trusting others. The propensity to 
trust strangers is thus likely to affect all types of CF (Table 4). What is important here is thin 
trust between strangers rather than thick trust between people that know each other. 
 
Prior research suggests that decisions related to economic undertakings are shaped by social 
behaviors (Lai et al., 2014). To put things in context, the degree of social trust among community 
members is a key component of social capital, which is related to obligations and expectations of 
support among community members, normally outside the family and ethnic group (Coleman, 
1988). Commenting on CF barriers in Russia, Gaidar Magdanurov, Runa Capital's Investment 
Director noted: “People want to be part of something constructive and have the money to do it. 
But the level of mutual mistrust here is higher, so crowdfunding will take longer to gain a 
foothold in Russia” (Avshalumova, 2013, para. 4). Likewise, the CEO of the Indonesian CFP, 
Wujudkan.com noted that Indonesians are less comfortable in trusting a stranger (ehipnews.com, 
2013). In the same vein, it is argued that Arab consumers tend to be suspicious and convincing 
them to invest in a project is not an easy task (Khalil, 2013). We propose that: 
 
Proposition 5 
 
Ceteris paribus, a CF project (LE, EQ, RE, DO) is more likely to be successful in raising funds 
via CBOTs in an economy characterized by a high degree of thin trust between strangers. 
 
3.3. Normative institutions' effects on fundraising via CBOTs 
 
3.3.1. Philanthropy as normative institutions: effects on reward- and donation-based CF 
 
Philanthropy can be viewed as a social relationship in which donors and recipients engage in 
projects that have mutual and shared interests (Ostrander, 2007). Such social dimension is an 
important component of normative institutions (Scott, 1995). Philanthropy and benevolence are 
more likely to affect reward- and donation-based CF projects than those motivated by economic 
returns such as equity- and loan-based CF projects (Table 4). 
 
Prior research indicates that social norm is a key determinant of whether, and how much people 
give (Radley and Kennedy, 1995). The degree of philanthropic involvement, which is defined as 
the degree to which people voluntarily allocate time, money and other resources to charitable, 
social and humanitarian initiatives and activities (Ricks and Williams, 2005) is thus linked to the 
success of a donation- or reward-based CF project. 
 
Looking at the pattern of CF, it is clear that something more than pure business dominance is 
going on. According to Massolution, CFPs seeking donations for charity or funding for creative 
projects in return for non-financial rewards (e.g., merchandise, access to computer games, or 
autographed albums) accounted for US$1.4 billion worldwide in 2012, which was more than half 
of the total CF investments (huffingtonpost.com., 2013). Massolution reported that social or 
philanthropic projects accounted for 30% of the worldwide CF investment in 2012. A CF project 
involving social or philanthropic purpose such as donations for charity is more likely to be 
successful in societies with a sense of social obligation to help others. 
 
People in some societies lack an intrinsic motivation to help others and demonstrate a weak 
socio-cultural orientation toward CF projects. For instance, the lack of civic and psychological 
orientations and the lack of training have hindered the development of the Arab CF industry 
(Khalil, 2013). These factors have arguably led to Arab countries' low level of charitable giving. 
One way to understand this aspect is that, compared to the West the Arab society is characterized 
by a low degree of social capital (Atiyyah, 1992). 
 
One indicator to understand the cross-cultural heterogeneity in generosity and propensity to help 
a stranger or volunteer time is the Charities Aid foundation's World Giving Index (WGI). WGI 
for 2014 was based on Gallup survey of 135 nations. The survey asked whether the respondents 
had given money to charity, volunteered or helped a stranger. The WGI for 2014 varied from the 
lowest of 14% for Yemen to the highest of 64% for the U.S. and Myanmar (CAF, 2014). 
 
Consider India, which ranked at 69 (WGI: 29%). According to the survey, only 39% of Indians 
gave money to charities,1 21% volunteered time and 38% helped a stranger (CAF, 2014). Some 
observers note that people in India care less about social causes and are less likely to offer 
money if there is no return (Chaudhary, 2013). 
 
Obviously people's propensities to engage in philanthropic activities determine the success of 
donation-based CF projects. For instance, a study conducted in Poland indicated that a higher 
proportion of respondents were motivated by helping artists rather than an investment as a 
motivation (Galuszka and Bystro, 2012). Moreover, the degree to which people support a 
reward-based CF may be driven predominantly by a philanthropic motive rather than an interest 
in the reward. 
 
Table 1 indicates that the U.K. performs better than Japan in the WGI ranking. This might have 
played an important role in the former's relatively bigger sizes of donation based and equity-
based CF than the later. Overall, societies characterized by a high tendency to voluntarily 
allocate time, money and other resources to charitable, social and humanitarian initiatives 
provide a supportive environment for the success of reward- and donation-based CF projects. 
The above leads to the following: 
 
Proposition 6 
 
Ceteris paribus, a CF project is more likely to be successful in raising reward- and donation-
based funds in an economy characterized with a high degree of philanthropic involvement. 
 
3.3.2. Trade associations as normative institutions: effects on equity- and reward-based CF 
 
Trade associations are an important component of normative institutions due to their roles in 
establishing norms and expectations for organizations (Kshetri, 2013). Many CF-related trade 
associations have been established mainly to influence entrepreneurial activities by promoting 
equity- and reward-based CF (Table 4). Regarding the effectiveness of such associations, it is 
worth noting that while the state is the most important institutional actor since violations of laws 
and regulations can result in harsh sanctions (Groenewegen and Van der Steen, 2007), national 
legal systems related to CF are far from effective in directing organizations' and individuals' 
behaviors. In nascent and formative sectors such as CF, there is no developed network of 
regulatory agencies comparable to those in established sectors (Kshetri and Dholakia, 2009; 
Powell, 1993). As a consequence, there is no stipulated template developed for organizing 
institutional actors' behaviors (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). 
 
Trade associations may play key roles in shaping the growth of a nascent sector such as CF. In 
prior literature, researchers have noted that such associations constitute the “most elaborate and 
intricate organizational arrangements” (Scott, 1992, p. 253) and play a significant role in 
legitimating institutional changes (Greenwood et al., 2002). Prior researchers have also 
emphasized that stakeholders that influence and are influenced by an ICT policy (e.g., trade 
associations) and the environment in which the policy is to be carried out are the most important 
factors shaping such policy (Anonymous, 2014). 
 
Among the key CF-related stakeholders are associations and trade groups. As of October 2013, 
World Crowdfund Federation (www.worldcrowdfund.org/) had members representing 17 
countries/regions, which consisted of nonprofit associations and trade groups related to CF. 
Table 5 presents some representative examples of such associations and trade groups. 
 
Table 5. Some representative examples of associations and trade groups related to CF. 
Association Country/region 
The National 
Crowdfunding 
Association (the 
U.S.) 
• Formed in March, 2012, its mission is to “support, educate, and 
protect” the U.S. CF market (nlcfa.org, UN, para. 1). It represents the 
interests of investor as well as the entrepreneur in equity, reward or 
donation CF. 
National 
Crowdfunding 
Association of 
Canada 
• It aim is to work closely with industry groups, government agencies, 
academia as well as other associations and in order to create a “strong 
and vibrant CF industry and voice across Canada”. 
National 
Crowdfunding 
Association of 
India 
• Its mission is to “support, educate, and establish” the Indian CF market 
(Alois, 2013a, para. 4). Membership is open to entrepreneurs, investors, 
and other actors interested in the development of the donation- as well 
as equity-based CF industry. 
The UK 
Crowdfunding 
Association 
• It was formed in 2012 by fourteen CFPs in order to create policies and 
best practices for the CF industry and market, which had over twenty 
members as of October 2013. Among its aims are to be the voice of all 
CF businesses (donations, loans and equity) to the public, press and 
policymakers and publish a code of practice for CF businesses. 
European 
Crowdfunding 
Network 
• Founded in 2011 as an interest group, it aims to promote transparency, 
self-regulation and governance in the CF industry, become the direct for 
the public's voice in policy making and cultivate public opinion. It also 
aims to further the understanding of the CF's roles in supporting 
entrepreneurship, creating jobs, enriching the European society, culture 
and economy, and protecting the environment. 
 
Trade associations and non-government organizations have provided some degree of institutional 
co-ordination in order to overcome the existing regulatory gap in CF and initiated steps to 
improve the CF ecosystem. For instance, the European Crowdfunding Network (ECN) was 
established in order to promote transparency, self-regulation and governance. The ECN aims to 
offer a voice in policy discussion and build a favorable public opinion of CF (Alois, 2014). 
Another example can be found in India, which had no formal laws governing CF as of 2013. The 
National Crowdfunding Association was established in 2012, whose mission is to “support, 
educate, and establish” India's CF market (Alois, 2013a, para. 4). 
 
Likewise, in Canada, the National Crowdfunding Association (NCFA) was created in order to 
voice the opinions of citizens and small businesses. Since there is no central regulator in Canada, 
rule changes in each of the country's 13 provinces and territories are required for equity CF to 
take place (launcht.com, 2013). The NCFA promotes awareness, advocacy, education and 
information about CF by working closely with diverse stakeholders such as industry group, trade 
associations, investors, government agencies, media, the public and academia in order to 
promote the CF industry's development. The Association aims to promote opportunities for 
networking and collaboration among CF professionals and share of best practices, organize 
webinars, conferences and other events, and identify and report frauds. The NCFA is making 
efforts to change the political, cultural and social discourses around CF. 
 
Trade associations can perform various roles in order to enrich the CF ecosystem. For instance, 
they can find ways to develop the talents and special abilities needed for the development of CF 
industry and market. They can train entrepreneurs and other categories of fundraisers to write 
quality CF proposals, which can pass all the steps successfully and raise the targeted funds. They 
can also help develop the ability among fundraisers to strengthen the track record of delivering 
quality products. Moreover, they can help fundraiser develop and implement effective 
advertising campaigns for CF projects. Especially in emerging economies, trade associations not 
only replace the roles that are often played by consultancy firms in filling the institutional voids 
(Back et al., 2014), but they may also engage in lobbying activities to convince policy makers to 
introduce legislative measures to facilitate the growth of CF. The discussion in this section is 
summarized as: 
 
Proposition 7 
 
Ceteris paribus, a CF project is more likely to be successful in raising equity- and reward-based 
funds in an economy characterized by the existence of CF-related trade associations. 
 
4. Discussion and implications 
 
From the above discussion it is clear that some of the major critical success factors for a CF 
project are tightly linked to the context provided by formal and informal institutions. That is, 
legitimacy issues from regulative, cognitive, and normative points of view are likely to influence 
the characteristics of a country's CF ecosystem and affect the success of CF projects. 
 
The theory presented in this paper provides an approach to answering our two research questions 
posed earlier. They were: RQ1: How do formal and informal institutions affect the success of a 
CF project?; RQ2: How do the effects of such institutions differ across different types of CF? 
Regarding the RQ1, the above discussion provides some insights into a CF project's acquisition 
of legitimacy in countries high in social capital, which are characterized by high degrees of thin 
trust and philanthropy involvement. The paper also provides insights into how regulators and 
trade associations can undertake activities that facilitate or hinder the performances of various 
forms of CF. In particular, CF's bottom-up and participatory approach would pose difficulties in 
countries where online contents tend to be largely top-down and monitored. While the 
governments of some authoritarian regimes such as China are interested in promoting 
entrepreneurship, they are against the diffusion of some uses of ICTs, which may slow down the 
diffusion of CF. 
 
As to the RQ2, it is clear from the seven propositions that different types of institutions have 
differential patterns of effects on the four types of CF. This point is also illustrated in Table 4 
which shows how some institutional components affect all types of CF but other components 
affect only some types of CF. For instance, authoritarianism and online experiences are likely to 
affect all forms of CF (Proposition 3 and Proposition 4). The main concern here is with the CFP 
rather than the fundraising activities. Authoritarian regimes tend to view the democratic nature of 
CFPs as a powerful challenge to their right to rule (Proposition 3). Likewise, in some cultures, 
there is a low propensity to trust CFPs and other online tools (Proposition 4). On the other hand, 
the creation of CF-related regulatory frameworks that balance the interests and perspectives of 
entrepreneurs and investors and general regulatory frameworks that facilitate entrepreneurship 
development mainly affects investments made with a profit motivation such as equity-based CF 
(Proposition 1 and Proposition 2). Although reward-based CF is greatly facilitating 
entrepreneurship, most countries have minimal regulations pertaining to this form of CF 
(Schroter, 2014). Most regulators are less interested in other forms of CF which often involve 
small amounts of money. Likewise, the focus of CF-related trade associations has been mainly 
on promoting entrepreneurship through equity- and reward-based CF (Proposition 7). Cultural-
cognitive and normative institutions such as the degree of thin trust and the degree of 
philanthropy involvement affect funding without a profit motivation such as donation- and 
reward-based CF. 
 
The theory presented in this paper also helps us understand the observed West-centricity of CF, 
which can be attributed to the formal and informal institutions that are friendlier to CF in the 
Western economies than in other parts of the world. A related point is that a lower rate of 
diffusion of CF in Asian economies can be explained as a result of a nascent institutional 
environment in the continent as well as the lack of compatibility with this form of funding. 
Entrepreneurs in Asian economies, however, have one important advantage over the West: social 
networks. Some experts have suggested that due to vulnerability to fraud, entrepreneurs are 
likely to be better off beginning their CF initiatives with their personal social networks 
(startupexemption.com, 2012). Since entrepreneurs in Asia tend to have an easier access to such 
networks due to the continent's history of backing smaller businesses and attracting funding from 
family and friends, CF would just move them into the digital environment (Huang, 2012). That 
said, the legitimacy issue may change with the scale of CF and the nature of the participants. In 
collectivist societies (e.g., Asia), the weak links people have outside their close circle of family 
and friends may lead to weak legitimacy of the CF from individuals outside this circle. Due to 
the low degree of thin trust, large-scale CF projects requiring huge amount of capital are thus 
less likely to perform well in Asia compared to the West. 
 
Compared to economic/technological factors, formal and informal rules of the game change 
slowly (Baumol, 1990). The legal system in an industry evolves more slowly compared to the 
development of the technology. In most economies, the CF industry is in urgent need of a clear 
regulatory framework. Moreover, informal institutions (e.g., the degree of thin trust) tend to 
change even slower compared to formal institutions (e.g., CF-related laws). North (1990, p. 6) 
noted: “although formal rules may change overnight as the result of political and judicial 
decisions, informal constraints embodied in customs, traditions, and codes of conduct are much 
more impervious to deliberate policies”. In some societies, concerns related to informal 
institutions such as the low propensity to trust strangers, the lack of generosity and a low degree 
of philanthropic involvement are likely to be more difficult to overcome. 
 
It is important to discuss the interrelationship among the various components of institutions. 
North (1994) observed that informal rules provide legitimacy to formal rules. Likewise, Axelrod 
(1997, p. 61) commented: “Social norms and laws are often mutually supporting. This is true 
because social norms can become formalized into laws and because laws provide external 
validation of norms”. The above propositions thus are not independent. For instance, fair and 
appropriate regulations may lead to the success of substantial CF projects. Exemplary CF 
projects, on the other hand, may drive social and cultural changes, which may lead to a higher 
propensity to trust strangers (thin trust) and confer legitimacy to CF. As another example we can 
mention a long history of tax incentives and codes that promote and encourage charitable giving 
and financial literacy programs in the U.S., which may explain the country's dominance in the 
global CF industry. Partly due to the lack of such regulations, Arab consumers are at an 
educational, cultural and psychological disadvantage, which explains the apparent lack of 
philanthropic spirit among them (Khalil, 2013). 
 
Regarding the effects of trade associations, they may be more effective in changing national CF 
policy and less effective in changing deeply ingrained cultural conventions, assumptions and 
practices. Compared to other CF types, they are thus likely to have relatively stronger effects on 
equity-based CF, where regulatory effects are a dominant influence on the behaviors of 
entrepreneurs and investors. 
 
4.1. Management and policy implications 
 
Assuming that relevant empirical evidence is found supporting the validity of the above 
propositions, our account has implications for management practices and public policy. In 
addition to policy efforts directed toward developing regulatory framework related to CF and 
improving the conduciveness of the regulatory environment to entrepreneurship, policy measures 
can be devised to change some components of informal institutions. For instance, measures taken 
to enhance consumers' digital experience and tax incentives and codes that promote and 
encourage charitable giving would give a major boost to CF. 
 
The evolution of CFPs may influence entrepreneurial financing in a number ways. For instance, 
CFPs may stimulate new investments. They may also modify the nature of existing investments. 
Finally, CFPs may just replace other forms of investment. The functioning of CFPs is critical to 
understanding the evolution of CF. In this regard, the first observation is that CFPs employ 
various mechanisms to screen the projects they display. The CFP, Seedrs, for instance, verifies 
the registration status of a firm. Only about a quarter of businesses that apply are accepted 
following Seedrs' oversight process, and of those, only about 12% get funded 
(Knowledge@Wharton, 2013). Likewise, China's first CFP, Demohour displays only 10% of the 
projects received (Xinhua., 2013). There remains the question of whether CF will stimulate new 
entrepreneurial activities by acting as a new source of funding for potential entrepreneurs who 
lack access to other funding sources or it will just act as an alternative source of funding for 
entrepreneurs who are also likely to have access to other sources. In the latter case, CF would 
just replace alternative sources of funding and thus would not have additional stimulation effect 
on entrepreneurial activities. It is essential to recognize that there is a large unmet need for 
entrepreneurial financing for most would be entrepreneurs. For instance, demand exceeds supply 
by a large factor in the global microfinance industry and market. One estimate suggested that as 
of 2010, 2.5 billion of the world's adults did not use formal or semiformal financial services (e.g., 
MFI) (Chaia et al., 2010). A 2007 report from the Deutsche Bank indicated that due to MFIs' 
funding limitations, only 10% of potential borrowers get loans. Looking at the criteria used by 
CFPs to scrutinize potential entrepreneurs, it is unlikely for most of the bottom of the pyramid 
entrepreneurs to get access to CF. 
 
Structural factors in developing countries which hinder SMEs' access to traditional forms of 
financing may also work against access to CF. For instance, many developing economies are 
characterized by the lack, or poor performance, of credit rating agencies to provide information 
about the creditworthiness of SMEs. A national credit bureau would collect and distribute 
reliable credit information and hence increase transparency and minimize the banks' lending 
risks. Many emerging economies lack such agencies or have poorly functioning ones. This 
situation puts SMEs in a disadvantaged position in the credit market. This is because SMEs tend 
to be more informationally opaque than large corporations because the former often lack 
certified audited financial statements and thus it is difficult for banks to assess or monitor the 
financial conditions. Thus many SMEs may not pass background checks carried out by third 
parties such as Crowdcube. This raises the possibility that SMEs that desperately need 
entrepreneurial financing may be the ones that are least likely to receive such funding. It is likely 
that the same entrepreneurs that have abilities to receive other sources of funding may have the 
greatest potential to benefit from CF. In this way, CF may replace alternative sources of funding 
and thus threaten the traditional credit and loan providers such as the banks and credit card 
companies. One estimate suggested that, in 2012, crowdlending, or peer-to-peer finance 
accounted for about three-quarter of funds raised by CFPs (Avery, 2012). 
 
It is important for the owners and promoters of CF projects to understand the cross-cultural 
variation in the investors' and fund contributors' expectations and motivations. Such an 
understanding can help prepare effective project pitch presentation, which may be viewed 
favorably by potential investors and fund contributors. For instance, many CF projects promoted 
by U.S.-based CFPs such as Kickstarter are product-based and people fund them expecting to 
receive a product in return. Brazilians, on the other hand, are arguably more interested in the 
project's social benefits (MCS, 2013). 
 
In the absence of appropriate policy measures, potential entrepreneurs who desperately need 
financing are less likely to benefit from CF. This situation demonstrates the need to expedite the 
establishment of, as well as to improve the effectiveness of credit rating agencies and develop 
targeted educational and training interventions that would enhance awareness of and ability to 
use CF by people at the bottommost of the economic pyramid. 
 
Entrepreneurs and other categories of fundraisers interested in raising funds for projects to be 
undertaken in an economy with an unfavorable CF-related institutional environment can focus 
their efforts to attract funds from donors and investors from economies that have more conducive 
institutional environment for CF. This approach is especially suitable for reward-based and 
donation-based CF, which tend to be more dependent on cultural-cognitive and normative 
institutions compared to other types of CF. For instance, in order to finance social projects in 
countries in which people lack philanthropic initiative, fundraising activities can be carried out in 
countries with a history and tradition of generosity and philanthropy. One such example is the 
project undertaken by Watsi to fund heart surgery of a 12-year-old girl from Nepal (Table 2). 
Crowdlending and crowdequity tend to be more regulated by the governments and in most cases 
the regulations are equally applicable to fundraising in the domestic market from domestic and 
foreign investors. However, there may be less concern for the regulators of a country if an 
entrepreneur from the country raises crowd-equity in foreign countries with more developed 
regulative institutions for raising such funds. 
 
Finally, given the global nature of CF, its growth hinges critically upon the compatibility of the 
payment mechanisms across countries. For instance, one challenge the CFP, Ideame has faced in 
becoming a regional player in Latin America concerned the variation in payment systems across 
economies in the region. It uses Dineromail for Chile and Mexico, MercadoPago for Argentina 
and MoIP for Brazil (Sreeharsha, 2012). International cooperation to harmonize such systems 
can stimulate the growth of this industry. 
 
5. Future research 
 
An important area for future research is to empirically test the propositions developed in this 
article. Such a test will be feasible when measures related to the dependent variables such as the 
size of the CF market and its various subsets become available for a broad range of countries. 
Table 1 provides some hints regarding how dependent variables and some independent variables 
can be measured with data aggregated at the country level. While constructs related to the trust in 
online transactions (Proposition 4) and thin trust (Proposition 5) can be difficult to measure, in 
Table 6, we offer some ideas as to how independent variables related to the remaining five 
propositions can be measured. During the early stage of the development of the CF industry, the 
existence of a CF-related regulatory framework for equity-based CF (Proposition 1) can be 
measured as a dichotomous variable (existence/non-existence). The World Bank's ease of doing 
business ranking can be used to measure the friendliness of the general regulatory framework for 
entrepreneurship (Proposition 2). Authoritarianism (Proposition 3) can be measured with 
Freedom House's civil liberties index or political freedom index. Likewise, WGI can be used to 
measure independent variables related to Proposition 6. Finally, the existence of CF-related trade 
associations can be measured as a dichotomous variable (existence/non-existence) (Proposition 
7). 
 
Table 6. Measuring the independent variables. 
Variable and related 
proposition(s) 
Explanation Related CF 
type(s) likely 
to be affected 
The existence of a CF-
related regulatory 
framework for equity-
based CF 
(Proposition 1) 
• A dichotomous variable: Existence or non-
existence of laws governing equity-based CF. 
EQ 
The friendliness of the 
general regulatory 
framework for 
entrepreneurship 
(Proposition 2) 
• The World Bank's ease of doing business 
ranking: A high ranking indicates that a country's 
regulatory environment is more conducive for 
starting and operating a business (The World 
Bank, 2015). 
EQ 
Authoritarianism 
(Proposition 3) 
• Civil liberties index or political freedom index 
of the Freedom House: A country is assigned two 
numerical ratings (1 to 7) for political rights and 
civil liberties (1: most free, 7: least free) 
(Freedom House, 2015). 
LE, EQ, RE, 
DO 
The degree of 
philanthropic 
involvement 
(Proposition 6). 
• Charities Aid foundation's WGI score, which is 
based on three indicators of giving behavior: 
proportion of people donating money to charity, 
volunteering time, and helping a stranger in a 
typical month (CAF, 2014). 
RE, DO 
Existence of CF-related 
trade associations 
(Proposition 7). 
• A dichotomous variable: existence or non-
existence of a CF-related trade association. 
EQ, RE 
Note: DV (project level): The extent to which a CF project is able to achieve the targeted 
fundraising goal. 
DV (national level): Per capita CF investment (one or more categories as predicted by the 
proposition under consideration). 
Crowdlending (LE), crowdequity (EQ), reward-based CF (RE), donation-based CF (DO). 
 
One issue that was raised but not fully addressed by the current study is the evolution of CF-
related associations (e.g., the NCFA of Canada). In future conceptual and empirical work 
scholars need to analyze these associations' roles by considering them as institutional change 
agents or institutional entrepreneurs. Note that institutional entrepreneurs challenge or disrupt 
particular models of social or economic orders and construct new organizational fields (Bartley, 
2007). They “lead efforts to identify political opportunities, frame issues and problems, and 
mobilize constituencies” and “spearhead collective attempts to infuse new beliefs, norms, and 
values into social structures” (Rao et al., 2000, p. 240). They also engage in activities related to 
deinstitutionalization or dissolution of existing logic or governance structure as well as 
institution formation, which entails the birth of a new logic or governance structure (Scott, 
2001). It is important to analyze the nature of resources available with CF-related associations 
and how they mobilize external and internal constituents, gain legitimacy, bridge the interests of 
diverse stakeholders and influence other actors to change their practices. Future research can also 
compare the roles of CF-related trade associations with similar association in other industries 
(e.g., offshoring industry in Kshetri and Dholakia, 2009). 
 
Another related future research direction is to analyze the factors that affect the evolution of CF-
related trade associations and compare such evolutions across countries. For instance, compare 
China and India. Whereas India's NCFA has been active in shaping the Indian CF industry and 
market, in China, special interest groups and non-government entities are organized loosely and 
there is little room for them to influence national policymaking (Su and Yang, 2000). A related 
concept to the influence and power of non-government actors is that of a participatory state, in 
which policies and institutions represent the wishes of the members of society (Sobel, 1999). In 
such a state, businesses participate in the national policy making arena through “dialogue, 
litigation, and mimesis” (Edelman and Suchman, 1997, p. 502). Business groups can also work 
closely with state agencies to protect their independence and autonomy (Greenwood and 
Hinings, 1996). Future research can examine how the mechanisms described above may affect 
the evolution and functioning of CF-related trade associations. 
 
Fourth, the above discussion indicated that a large proportion of projects received by CFPs are 
not displayed. In this research, we only looked at how institutional factors affect investors' ability 
and willingness to invest in a CF project. In this regard, another intriguing avenue for future 
research is to examine how institutional factors affect the CF-related knowledge, skills and 
abilities of various actors in the CF ecosystem, presentation of CF projects and projects that are 
displayed by CFPs. 
 
Fifth, in addition to raising capital, CF's advantages also include providing start-ups with a 
platform to pilot marketing ideas and gather market data before spending money on a campaign. 
Individuals across the world differ significantly in the way in which they view and provide 
supports to these initiatives. Especially the effectiveness of such an approach may be reduced in 
an economy with an underdeveloped market culture. In future research, thus, scholars may study 
the institutional settings as well as the nature of products and services that are suitable for such 
purpose from the perspective of CF. 
 
Sixth, there is a cross-cultural variation in the fundraisers' and fund contributors' goals, 
expectations, attitudes and motivations associated with CF projects. For instance, it is common 
that projects in U.S.-based CFPs such as Kickstarter are funded at much higher levels than 
originally asked for by the project creators (e.g., 500%, 1000% or more). One such example is 
Eric Migicovsky's “smartwatch” (Table 2). As noted earlier, whereas many CF projects 
promoted by U.S.-based CFPs are product-based and people fund them expecting to receive a 
product in return, Brazilians tend to be more interested in the project's social benefits. It is also 
rare in Brazil for a project to be funded at a level higher than asked for by the project creator 
(MCS, 2013). Future research into this area may help understand cross-cultural differences in 
cognitive preferences that may be attributable to this difference. Further research is also needed 
to examine how the various CF types differ across cultures in terms of fundraisers' and fund 
contributors' goals, expectations, attitudes and motivations. 
 
Seventh, in future research scholars also need to consider the effects of individuals' income level 
and general education level on their willingness to contribute to fundraising via CBOT. Prior 
research indicates that the income level and general education level are tightly linked to political 
and social engagement. Holm and Danielson's (2005) study conducted in Tanzania and Sweden 
indicated that people have a lower tendency to trust strangers in developing countries than in 
developed countries. Likewise, Nie et al. (1996) showed that individuals with higher education 
levels are more likely to trust strangers, engage in civic actions and participate in elections. 
Moreover, cooperative behavior is also a function of the level of education of the social 
environment in addition to the focal person's level of education. Helliwell and Putnam (2007, p. 
1) noted: “My behavior can be affected not only by my education, but also by that of others 
around me. The core issue is whether (holding constant my own education), I am more likely or 
less likely to participate politically and socially if those around me become more educated”. The 
idea here is that when a higher social capital in groups leads to an increase in the propensity to 
trust strangers and outsiders, everyone is likely to be better off due to the generalized benefits of 
social capital and thin trust (Cox, 2004). 
 
Finally, in this research, we did not assess the impact of various characteristics of the 
entrepreneurs and other categories of fundraisers that would determine the success of the CF 
project. In future research scholars also need to consider how factors such as reputation of the 
artist would affect the success of a CF project. 
 
6. Concluding comments 
 
The above discussion makes it clear that for CF projects, formal and informal institutions 
mediate the relationships among fund raisers, potential investors, regulators and other social 
actors. Friendly regulative, normative and cognitive institutions are key elements of a well-
developed CF ecosystem, which provide a positive feedback and create a virtuous circle of CF. 
A well-functioning CF ecosystem, on the other hand, provides an opportunity for entrepreneurs 
to develop CF campaigns with effective project pitch presentation, which is viewed favorably by 
regulators and potential investors. 
 
From the above analysis, it is clear that regulators directing efforts to encourage the development 
of the CF industry and market as well as entrepreneurs, artists, and other entities interested in 
fundraising via CFPs need to consider the complexity associated with the actions of various 
institutional actors and their diverse legitimacy concerns. Due to the underdeveloped regulatory 
framework and the unique nature, there is a higher likelihood of investors being duped by CF 
than by most other forms of investment. On the other hand, regulations that focus too narrowly 
on investor protection may hinder genuine entrepreneurial efforts. Thus promulgation of 
effective CF regulations will require effective and careful balancing of the interests of investors 
and entrepreneurs. 
 
Overall given regulators' interest in stimulating entrepreneurial activities, we might expect more 
rapid changes in CF-related formal/regulative institutions compared to informal institutions. On 
the other hand, in the long run, if a favorable regulatory environment is created and many 
successful CF projects are undertaken, we would also expect positive changes in cognitive and 
normative institutions related to CF. 
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